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This paper tracks the impact of prison transfers (and mobility considerations more generally) on 
the spatio-temporal regimes pursued within the British Penal Estate. I argue that what appear 
from outside as static spaces of detention are in fact nodes within a network deeply 
crisscrossed by internal patterns of mobility and the problematics of time-space coordination.  I 
explore the power relations that shape prisoner patterns of movement and highlight the 
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Over the course of 2010 HMP Leeds, a large ‘local prison’ in the English Midlands, sent 
6,777 prisoners to the courts and received 9,460, it transferred to other prisons 1,882 prisoners 
and received 480; it managed 780 hospital escorts for medical appointments and treatment, as 
well as initiating 11,411 furloughs for funerals, dying relatives, home leaves or town visits (IMP 
2010c, 19). 1   The scale, complexity and frequency of this movement are not atypical for such 
an institution. Indeed HMP Leeds represents a single node in an expansive prison network (the 
British Penal estate) deeply crisscrossed by internal patterns of mobility and the external 
entry/exit flows of the broader criminal justice system within which it is embedded. 
And yet, though the daily ‘churn’ of admitting, relocating and discharging prisoners is 
clearly a core facet of everyday penal governance it sits uneasily against the commonsense view 
                                                     
1 A furlough is a temporary release from prison for a short duration of time to either respond to 
an exceptional, personal circumstance (e.g., medical necessity, compassionate grounds, 
marriage) or a wider criminal justice need (e.g., paid or unpaid work placements, training or 
education). This practice is formally called Release on Temporary License (ROTL) and under its 
heading, a broad array of temporary release options are possible (i.e., Resettlement Day 
Release [RDR], Resettlement Overnight Release [ROR], Childcare Resettlement License [CRL] 





that prisons are islands of incapacity; totalizing and warehousing institutions (Goffman 1961, 
Irwin 2005) where prisoners feel the constraint of restricted mobility and the weight of ‘dead 
time’ (Johnson 2005: 256). The above tension parallels another commonsense disjuncture, this 
time scalar: when one thinks of prisons one is more likely to envisage single institutions and not 
systems or networks of prisons. Further still from everyday view might be the expansive 
carceral structures that reach beyond these institutions into the community and anchor 
ongoing practices of criminalization and hyper-incarceration (Wacquant 2001, 2009). Both 
fallacies occlude key points in understanding contemporary practices of imprisonment and their 
connection to the broader political economic arrangements they help to shape and sustain 
(Davis 2003; De Giorgi 2006; Gilmore 2007).  
Scholars attentive to the political dimensions of mobility (Creswell 1999, 2006) have 
emphasized that social acceleration (Rosa 2013) generates new hegemonic practices and 
subjugated identities (Law 1999; Imrie 2000; Urry 2004; Adey 2004; Neumayer 2006; Gogia 
2006; Sager 2006; Franquesa 2011). Within this literature, the de-mobilization of traditionally 
‘mobile’ groups like tramps, gypsies and other ‘nomads’ (Mitchell 1997; Hetherington 2000; 
Creswell 2001; Shubin 2011) or the contingent and coerced mobility of migrants and refugees 
have been analyzed (Kofman 2002; Shuster 2005). Others have complemented the focus on the 
mobility of groups with the study of state mobility systems drawing important parallels 
between structures of detention and structures of imprisonment: both produce contradictory 
formulations and rearrangements of the mobility/containment dynamic (Gill 2009a; Martin and 





For example, Mountz et al. (2013) have noted that emergent detention practices and 
processes attempt to fix, know and identify incoming migrants as well as to ‘seal off’ and 
contain their bodies in remote detention centers. Yet such practices also produce highly mobile 
identities and bodies, through the erasure of individuality and the application of generalized 
suspicion or through the transfers and deportations deemed necessary to produce future states 
of immobility (527-528).  Similarly Gill (2009a, 2009b) has noted that the British State deploys 
strategies of mobility and stillness in the governance of asylum seekers. Transfers and seizures 
are frequent, sudden and traumatic; they destabilize staff-migrant relations as well as interrupt 
and motivationally challenge the work of advocacy groups (Gill 2009b). Indeed, in this account 
geographical, psychological and corporeal stillness becomes the antithesis of ‘governmental 
mobility’ and an important source of resistance.     
Turning from analyses of detention practices to the academic commentary on 
imprisonment, space and movement, accounts of the prison’s ‘revolving door’ (Clemmer 1958; 
Irwin 1980; 1985; Scarce 2002; Crewe 2009) can be contrasted with the enforced seclusion and 
immobility of prisoners in long-term confinement or supermax prisons (Kurki and Morris 2001; 
Haney 2003; Rhodes 2004; Mears and Reisig 2006).  High recidivism and reoffending rates 
maintain heavy flows through US state penal institutions even as spatial solutions that prioritize 
containment seemingly proliferate.  At the same time, a focus on the “spatiality of 
imprisonment” underscores the “necessarily insular and outwardly dependent” (Bonds 
2013:1391) nature of prisons and their connection to carceral frameworks and structures 
(Wacquant 2001, Peck 2003, Martin and Mitchelson 2009). Important themes in these carceral 





2013a, 2013b), the political economy of criminalization and prison siting (Che 2005; Gilmore 
2007; Bonds 2009, 2013), the destructive impact of variable policing strategies, high 
imprisonment and coercive mobility on urban neighborhoods (Clear et. al. 2003; Clear 2007; 
Desmond and Valdez 2012) and the emergence of the prison as a “labor market institution” 
that “shapes the social distribution of work and wages” among increasingly contingent labor 
forces (Peck and Theodore 2008: 276). 
This paper builds on the above insights by focusing on the transportation dynamics that 
animate one macro-level component of the carceral chain. I hope to illustrate how the tension 
between stillness and movement, containment and mobility described above is navigated and 
managed within the British penal context and in its network of institutions. With some notable 
exceptions (e.g., Martin and Mitchelson 2009; Moran, Piacentini and Pallot 2011) much of the 
literature on prisoner movement focuses on the many points of intersection between prisons 
and the outside, but I want to emphasize the importance of mobility and movement within the 
system itself and throughout the entire spatio-temporal process of incarceration. To do so, I 
outline the practices through which the British Penal Estate operationalizes prisoner movement 
and explain what these practices reveal about the functioning of power “in motion”. 
In the next section, I describe the institutional scaffolding that supports and drives the 
penal estate’s transportation system which is characterized by two countervailing approaches 
to prisoner transfers (a top-down, instrumental application of prisoner movement pursued 
alongside and against an embodied, progressive system of prisoner mobility). I argue that taken 
together, these modalities of movement comprise veritable regimes of circulation. That is, they 





becomes a crucial component in the operation and maintenance of penal power. Drawing upon 
management and organizations research, I then move to the identification of the ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors that have animated and determined the near history of prisoner movement. I 
focus on the combined impact of estate-wide overcrowding and new sentencing and offender 
management frameworks introduced by the British state since 2003 to problematize the 
seemingly self-evident market analogy of supply and demand so frequently championed to 
justify penal expansionism.2 The following section then shifts to the examination of penal flows 
themselves: it tracks the pattern of prisoner movement engendered by regimes of circulation 
and highlights some of the distinctive spatio-temporal states of deprivation they generated. 
Finally, I conclude by showing how the mobility practices I describe are themselves undergoing 
a process of carceral ‘rearrangement’ linked to the abolition of IPP sentences and the 




                                                     
2 The empirical material for this paper draws extensively on the documents, investigations, 
inspections and reports published by the Ministry of Justice between 2003 and 2013. The most 
important set of documents analyzed are the inspection reports of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate 
of Prisons (HMIP) and the annual reports of the Independent Monitoring Boards (IMB) of 
individual prisons. Every prison in the estate is inspected, at a minimum, every five years (but 
frequently HMIP manages to do this once every 2-3 years). Inspections are in-depth and 
generate lengthy reports that detail the overall conditions of custody, the range of activities 
and services provided, the challenges faced by these institutions and the character and needs 
of their populations. Throughout the period under study, the progression of prisoners under 
indeterminate sentences, overcrowding and prisoner transport were key areas of comparison 
among different institutions. In contrast, each prison has an IMB board composed of volunteers 
(appointed by the Home Office) that monitor the standards of care within their individual 
prisons. Each year they submit an annual report that documents their observations; often these 





Regimes of Circulation 
 
A traditional view of prisons emphasizes their location ‘behind the scenes’ of everyday 
life and their role as containers of violence and power (Elias 1985: 236-238). Such power, at 
least in its late 19th and early 20th century formulations, was conceived as instrumental in 
application and impersonal in character. It flowed from the top-down and was asymmetrically 
structured; when needed it could deploy coercion and violence to command obedience  
(Weber 1978:53-54, Sykes 1958, Jacobs 1977, DiIulio 1990). Though the reality and efficacy of 
this zero-sum understanding of power has been empirically (Sykes 1958, Colvin 1982, Simon 
2000) and theoretically (Foucault 1977, Allen 2003, Lukes 2004) much critiqued, it retains a 
degree of permanence evident, for example, in the direction of official bureaucratization, the 
self-understanding of prison staff, or the character of institutional prerogatives.  
Understood in this more limited way instrumental modes of structuring power use 
movement as a resource. A capability that facilitates prison order, shores up internal security 
(through segregation or dispersal) and structures the daily hum of inmate life in time and space 
(Sparks, Bottoms and Hay, 1996: 273, Kantrowitz 1996: xv, Philo 2001:476). Circular Instruction 
10/1974, an administrative control measure that was prominent in the UK until the early 1990s, 
provides a good example of instrumental modes of deploying movement and their de-
subjectifying effects. The “ghost-train” or “magic roundabout” (as CI 10/1974 was known 
among prisoners) accounted for as many as 100,000 transfers per year and it allowed the 





segregation cells in local prisons for a ‘cooling off period’ (Cavadino and Dignan 2007:225).3 
Though formally justified as necessary to secure ‘Good Order and Discipline,’ in practice it 
became an expedient way to circumvent institutional restrictions on the permanent transfer of 
troublesome prisoners, as well as a powerful tool of coercion and deprivation in its own right; 
transferred prisoners might move to a new prison every few months, sometimes without ever 
emerging from punitive detention (Sparks, Bottoms and Hay, 1996: 268-271). 
For single institutions control and safety issues remain important drivers of instrumental 
transfers yet for the broader prison network, questions of security must be weighed alongside 
the management of population pressures and overcrowding. At the latter level, movement is 
centrally deployed and works to maintain crowding within the estate’s prisons under safe and 
legally proscribed parameters by redistributing groups of prisoners in line with available places 
(wherever and whenever those might appear). This shift in scale (from single institutions to 
networks of prisons) also implies a shift in optics. Prisoners become mere extracts from the 
actuarial and statistical record, gaining relevance as bundles of favorable characteristics and 
cross-sections of risk scores (i.e., short sentences close to completion, low flight risk, etc.) that 
make them suitable for transfer. In UK prisons, this particular mode of managing the problem of 
fixed spatial resources is known as the ‘overcrowding draft’ and, as we will see, has become a 
                                                     
3 The relevant section of CI 10/1974 stated: " The purpose of this facility offered to dispersal 
governors is to provide a brief 'cooling off' period for a troublemaker who needs to be removed 
from normal location because of an imminently explosive situation caused by either his actual 
or impending disruptive behaviour, and for whom placement in the segregation unit is 
inappropriate or impracticable, either because the prisoner would still be able to exercise a 
disruptive influence from the segregation unit (because of inadequate insulation between the 
segregation unit and the main prison), or because the extent to which the prisoner provides a 
focal point for prisoner unrest would mean that the mere act of placement in the segregation 
unit could have a provocative and explosive effect on the rest of the establishment." R. v. 





mainstay of prison management under penal populism (Bottoms 1995, Pratt 2007). Finally I 
should note that despite its centrality, the overcrowding draft remains decidedly low-tech and 
hence somewhat removed from the sort of algorithmic technologies (Amoore 2008; Amoore 
and Hall 2009) described by some authors in the context of securitization and border control.  
On the other hand much of the contemporary literature on prisons and the ‘carceral’ or 
transcarceral (Allspach 2010) forms of power that are connected with and go beyond it, has 
stressed the point that power within the penal context increasingly takes an embodied and self-
directed form (Vaz and Bruno 2003, Haney 2005; van Hoven and Sibley 2008). Power is said to 
be decentralized, networked, functioning-at-a distance and nested within systems of 
surveillance, knowledge and expertise (Foucault 1978; Rose 1989, Miller and Rose 1990, 
Garland 1997, Dirsuweit 1999, Philo 2001, Simon 2005). Disciplinary techniques increasingly 
involve strategies of responsibilization and entrepreneurship whereby prisoners are prompted 
to become agents oriented towards their personal and psychological self-development (Garland 
1997:191-192, Liebling 2004, Rose 2000, Allspach 2010). In the UK, official expectations have 
now moved beyond outward alignment with institutional rules and procedures: prisoners must 
demonstrate their compliance through psychological assessments and group work, completions 
of vocational, cognitive behavioral and educational coursework as well as maintaining a clean 
disciplinary record (Crewe 2009: 115-137).  
Disciplinary applications of power produce ‘embodied’ forms of movement; a point well 
illustrated by the ideal-typical progression model for IPP (an indeterminate sentence handed 





UK are indeterminate).4 After sentencing, prisoners are transferred to a local prison (the 
gateway to the penal estate) where over the course of a few months their life sentence plans 
are prepared. The plan is a written blueprint of how the inmate’s time will be spent detailing: 
risk evaluations, offending behavior to address and arrangements for doing so, as well as a 
schedule of reviews and progress reports. Shortly thereafter, they are moved to a first stage 
prison where more assessments are carried out, plans are finalized and intervention targets set. 
The self-improvement work begins when the lifer is transferred to a second stage prison though 
at this point it is unlikely that all the risk reduction targets can be met in the same institution 
(each prison offers a very limited suite of modules and interventions) so it is common that a 
prisoner might be subsequently transferred multiple times to access the required resources. 
Finally, with a release date approaching, the offender would be moved again, this time to 
prepare for release into the community at a third stage prison (PSO 4700; Pyszora 2010: 198).  
Within the above context, movement and mobility become embedded components of 
the custodial sentence binding time, space and movement into a progressive sequence. In the 
                                                     
4Though formally called a “life” sentence, all life sentenced prisoners will eventually be eligible 
for parole upon completion of their minimum term (if the parole board agrees). There are three 
types of life sentence in the UK: mandatory, discretionary and automatic. Mandatory sentences 
are the only sanction available for murder, discretionary sentences involve life as the maximum 
penalty for a serious offense other than murder (e.g., manslaughter, armed robbery, rape etc.) 
and automatic sentences follow from a second conviction for a serious violent or sexual offense 
(HMIP and PRT 2001). Indeterminate Sentences for Public Protection (repealed in December 
2012) effectively functioned as discretionary life sentences (one received a minimum sentence 
to serve and could only be released when deemed no longer a threat by the parole board) with 
three important qualifications: 1) minimum terms were generally shorter than life sentence 
minimums because the offenses were considered ‘less serious’ (before the 2008 amendments 
ca. 1/3 of IPPs had a minimum of 2 years or less); 2) they were imposed for crimes that did not 
carry life as a maximum sentence; and 3) IPPs could apply to have their ‘life license’ (i.e., life-
long parole supervision) terminated after 10 years (PSO 4700 Lifer Manual 2006:2, Jacobson 





ideal, a prisoner is concurrently moving between different phases of his sentence, different 
security categories and different kinds of institutions in a staggered trajectory oriented towards 
release. Though the progressive model is ideal-typical, and most onerous for those prisoners on 
indeterminate sentences that must rely on it to secure release, it generally describes the 
sentence trajectory of most determinate medium to long-term prisoners as well. In contrast 
with instrumental movement, progressive movement is locally arranged and matches 
institutions with relevant coursework with prisoners in scope to receive them. Thus progressive 
movement can be identified as one operationalization of the sort of penal leveling described 
above: prisoners become the carriers of the system’s disciplinary grid and link the different 
institutional spaces they traverse into a recognizable network or system of power. Mobility thus 
becomes an integral component of the self-governance strategies that have relocated the 
harness of institutional control within the inmate ‘soul’ (Foucault 1975) and transformed it into 
a ‘vehicle of power’ (Crewe 2011: 524).  
Let me be clear. The instrumental and embodied applications of prisoner movement 
sketched above are not mutually exclusive, nor are they historically determined in the sense 
that we can chart a movement where one ceases to be applicable and the other becomes 
dominant. On the contrary they illustrate the dual, often contradictory and enduring premises 
upon which late-modern penal power rests. A scalar, instrumental model of domination set 
over and against discrete chains and series of decentralized, individual plans of self-
improvement. Together they generate and sustain divergent Regimes of Circulation.  That is, 
parallel applications of the penal system’s apparatus of control where movement becomes an 





In the next section I focus on how ongoing problems of fixed spatial resources, in light of 
increasing population pressures and estate-wide overcrowding, collided with offender 
management and sentencing changes introduced by the Criminal Justice Act of 2003. I argue 
that these changes, which bound the risk-based structuring of custodial sentences to a 
prisoner’s progression through different institutions and temporal benchmarks, helped 
generate sustained disruptions and fissures in the estate system’s circuits of mobility.  
 
Problems of Population 
 
The British Penal Estate is made up of 133 prisons located in England and Wales. 
Between 1993 and 2013 the incarcerated population doubled and is currently fluctuating 
around 85,000 prisoners. This figure represents an approximate overcrowding rate of 10-11% 
or 10,000 prisoners over the system’s design specifications (i.e. Certified Normal 
Accommodation) (Ministry of Justice 2013, Scott and Flynn 2014: 136-137).  Though this 
number is not as large as in some other countries (for example the incarcerated population of 
the state of California in the US more than doubled the system’s capacity in the mid-2000s) it 
also masks some important considerations. Firstly the Certified Normal Accommodation (CNA) 
figure underestimates overcrowding because a ‘normal’ degree of overcrowding is already 
included in it and secondly (as Table 1 illustrates) there is significant variation between 
institutions in terms of their degree of overcrowding. Thus for example, by the end of June 
2013, 56 percent of prisons (69) were overcrowded and nine of these had a population 150 





[TABLE 1 HERE] 
The above suggest that the prison network routinely operates with little or no capacity 
to accommodate excess prisoners. Yet administrators, despite having no control over the 
number of admissions, must find places within their institutions for incoming numbers.  In this 
sense, the penal estate might be likened to a ‘push system’, to adopt a term more popular in 
operations and management research. Push systems refer to a manufacturing process where 
work output moves from one station to the next when it is completed without knowing 
whether the next station is ready for the increased work (Benton 2010). Because of this push 
systems can generate costly inventories if the flow of work between stations is not well 
coordinated ahead of time.  
Though prisons are not factories and prisoners are not products, push rationales drive 
the transportation infrastructure in most prison systems.5 As Peck and Theodore (2008) have 
noted with respect to the correctional system in Illinois, flows in and out of prisons are 
continuous, large in scale and reflect a rough equilibrium between admissions and releases. In 
contrast, the UK Penal estate discharges approximately 85,000 individuals per year (a little 
more than its total population) but receives approximately 120,000 new receptions a year (ca. 
                                                     
5 Though prison management guidelines do not explicitly reference organizational and 
management texts in the development of policy, it is worth noting that the practices described 
in this article emerged in connection with a managerial reorganization of the prison and 
probation service known as the New Managerialism or New Public Management (Hood 1991). 
This administrative transformation involved the introduction of private sector practices like 
audits, corporate reports, performance targets, incentive-based performance measures and 
weighted scorecards (which rank individual prisons quarterly in league tables) amidst stock-
phrases like ‘value for money’, ‘evidence-based policy’, ‘quality of service’, and ‘strategic 







140 per cent of its total population) generating significant flows in and out of prison, as well as 
between prisons and other criminal justice agencies (approximately 25 percent of new 
receptions are prisoners on remand) (Table 2). In the context of the limited cell space noted 
above, this steady overflow of incoming prisoners places continual pressure on administrators 
to keep individual institutions within acceptable margins through the use of overcrowding 
drafts and other instrumental forms of movement. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
A second source of pressure on the estate’s transportation system involves the growth 
in indeterminate sentences, which sit at the far end of the progressive movement continuum. 
There were 5,147 prisoners serving indeterminate sentences in 2002 and, as illustrated in Table 
2, this number rose to 7,275 in 2006 and then increased to double that by 2012. Though 
accounting for only 19 percent of the prison population the bulk of these prisoners were 
serving new Indeterminate sentences for public protection (IPP) introduced in 2003. Because 
they involved individuals deemed dangerous to the public, IPP sentences were linked to a series 
of intervention “packages” (e.g., Cognitive Behavioral Therapy courses) and risk assessment 
protocols.  
One important effect of the introduction of IPPs was the stretching of disciplinary layers 
and the multiplication of evaluation hurdles not only for these prisoners but also for medium 
and long-term prisoners more generally.  This shift impacted the penal system’s mobility 
patterns dramatically; it introduced new levels of indeterminacy as immobility expanded and 
average time-served for some categories of prisoners dilated. Because behavioral modules tend 





sentences spent significant time in long queues, waiting for places on specialized courses at 
different institutions (mandatory if they hoped to be considered for parole) (Strickland and 
Grimwood 2013). For example, Acklington prison, one of four institutions that ran the Healthy 
Relationships Programme in 2009, had 16 places per year and a two-year waiting list (HMIP 
2009a: 97-98).  Similarly, HMP Long Lartin one of five institutions that offered the Cognitive 
Self-Change Programme in 2011 had 6 places per year and a 3-year waiting list (HMIP 2011c: 
76). While some queued for courses, others waited idly for sentencing plan reviews and risk 
assessments to be undertaken or completed. 
In the context of the wider push network described above, progressive movement 
increasingly took the form of a mini ‘pull’ system. Pull systems refer to manufacturing processes 
(e.g., Just-in-Time or Lean Production) where work moves from one station to the next only 
when the next station demands it. The emphasis is on communication and scheduling because 
pull systems function with little or no inventories and thus impose very high transaction costs 
whenever the temporal sequencing of events is disrupted (Castells 1996:157; Harvey 1989: 175-
178; Sadler 1994: 42-43). In the penal estate, prisoners sit on waiting lists for places at 
institutions with interventions. When both cell space and an intervention slot become available 
the prisoner gets ‘pulled’ from their current locale into the new position (presumably leaving 
open cell space for the next person in line).  
 Push and pull imperatives produce divergent trajectories of movement and pose 
systemic challenges when implemented concurrently. As more prisoners move through the 
network and overcrowding levels remain high, transfers between institutions for progressive 





designed to generate cell-space and relieve crowded conditions (IMB 2009d: 27; 2010: 30; IMB 
2012b: 28). Indeed, the situation for IPP prisoners pre and post 2008 is a good illustration of 
how push and pull mechanisms work against one another to generate ‘interruptions’ in the 
estate system’s circuitry of power.  
Risk assessments and sentence plans are dependent on the availability of specialist staff 
and their workloads, as well as the input of multiple actors in different locales (IMB 2010a: 20-
21; IMB Garth 2010b: 54). By 2008, assessment wait times for IPP prisoners had become so 
acute that the progressive sequence was amended to allow them to skip first-stage lifer prisons 
and progress directly from local prisons to second-stage training prisons (Jacobson and Hough, 
2010: 69). This alleviated the strain on the gateway institutions (local prisons) where 
assessments are performed but pushed this disruption further down the institutional chain and 
deep into the penal estate. Those prisons providing specialized courses open not only to IPP 
prisoners but other lifers and medium term prisoners, now faced pressure to move their 
current populations onto open prisons (where offenders prepare for release into the 
community) to make way for the new incoming cohorts.  
Thus what came to characterize progressive movement under these conditions was 
hardly the sort of linear, continuous and embodied fusion of space-time trajectories envisaged 
by administrators and officials. Instead, fissure zones appeared in the prison’s temporal order 
as pockets of acceleration, deceleration and inertia proliferated and expanded across the penal 
estate. In the next section, I examine these disruptions and contradictions up close by mapping 






Scaling Penal Flows 
 
Virtually all prisoner escorts in the British penal estate and the wider criminal justice 
system are provided by Prisoner Escort and Custody Service (PECS) or Secure Escort Services for 
Children and Young People (SESCYP); the PECS contract is shared among the private security 
firms GEOAmey and Serco (Wincanton, a supply chain solution provider is a joint-partner), the 
SESCYP contract is handled exclusively by Serco (HMIP 2014:5).  Table 3 summarizes selected 
prisoner transportation data for the criminal justice system over 3 months in 2013-2014. The 
scale of this movement is substantial (189,069 escorts), as is its annual cost of £ 137.3 Million 
(HMIP 2014:5).  As the data illustrates, the greater volume of traffic (46%) is located at the 
front-end of the penal estate in ‘local’ prisons, the initial receiving points for transfers from 
police stations or the courts and the gateway into the penal estate. Local prisons (much like 
American “jails” in the prison systems of individual states) process prisoners with divergent 
temporal and mobility horizons: a) they serve the courts in their area (i.e., they house 
remanded and unsentenced prisoners); b) accommodate sentenced prisoners awaiting transfer 
to other institutions and; c) are where most short-term sentences (under 12 months but more 
often under 6 months) will be served.   
[TABLE 3 HERE]  
Given the numbers involved looping, steering, and queuing the movement of these 
different populations remains a considerable challenge. For example, HMP Highdown processes 
430 new receptions and 600 movements between it and the courts per month (HMIP 2009h, 





the push system balancing 7,670 receptions against 8,270 exits per year (IMB 2012: 14).  And 
even these numbers represent just a small proportion of the 80,000 prisoners that shuffle 
between the courts and local prisons estate-wide per month (HMIP 2011a: 25). Local prisons 
are central nodes in the system’s mobility network: they sift, sort and link individual trajectories 
of spatio-temporal movement with the dominant regimes of prisoner circulation in the estate. 
Because of their high turnovers and the transient nature of their prisoners, the bulk of their role 
is primarily one of facilitating movement between prisons, between prisons and other justice 
institutions and between the prison system and the outside. Even for short-term prisoners 
serving sentences there, imprisonment is closer in character to temporary detention (i.e., few 
programmed activities, interventions and self-improvement opportunities) than it is to the rest 
of the penal estate.  
As I argued in the previous section, the introduction of new indeterminate sentences in 
the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 (as well as the changes in offender management they 
embodied) effectively multiplied and lengthened the disciplinary segments that make up the 
progressive chain.  In terms of the broader estate mobility system, the full impact of this was 
felt between 2007 and 2010. Indeed between 2007 and 2009 there were 270,000 transfers 
across prisons in England and Wales—an average of 2,600 inter-prison transfers per week 
(Ministry of Justice 2010:7). Throughout this period the contradictory rationales that shaped 
and drove prisoner movement were brought into sharp relief producing corridors of high traffic, 
chains of dislocation and islands of ‘dead time’.   
If one were to map the broad trajectories of inter-prison flows two corridors of traffic 





from London and the South West to the Midlands and the North West. One prominent example 
of this movement and the wider displacement patterns it produced involves local prisons in the 
London area, HMP Birmingham and HMP Liverpool. Besides serving the courts in its area, 
Birmingham (a local male prison) would receive sometimes daily overcrowding drafts from 
London prisons and would displace an equal number of its local prisoners further North to 
Liverpool or to HMP Forest Bank (HMIP 2007a: 61; HMIP 2009j:10; 2012 and HMIP 2007b: 19; 
2009c:22,45, 89; 2011b:21; HMIP 2010b:90).  Not surprisingly this created a domino effect in 
that HMP Liverpool (also a local prison) had to displace its own prisoners to other institutions to 
free up cell space for Birmingham inmates. Traffic also flowed from other directions: HMP 
Durham (another local prison in the Northeast) would generate fortnightly drafts to and from 
Edinburgh as well as 50 weekly transfers to prisons in the Northwest (HMIP 2009d: 91). 
Displacement and dislocation clearly disrupted ongoing processes of assessment and 
intervention delivery but they also introduced significant discontinuity at multiple levels of 
institutional life.  Prisoners were transferred before risk assessments were completed or 
coursework was finished (HMIP 2011d: 55), they missed healthcare visits or appointments. It 
was not uncommon for prisoners to be informed on the morning or night before the move that 
they had been “drafted” and so relatives arrived for visit days to find their loved ones already 
moved; links with legal advisors, property and entitlements were routinely interrupted (HMIP 
2009j: 45-46). At its most extreme displacement could mean that prisoners on their way to 
court would take property and cash with them because they could not be certain that they 
would return to the same prison in the evening (HMIP 2007b:21).  Or, that unconvicted 





(HMIP 2009k: 60). The ideal typical prisoner for an overcrowding draft is a low security risk and 
serving a short-term sentence with less than six months left (NAO 2005: 26; HMIP 2009e: 80). 
Short-term prisoners also have the highest reoffending rates in the correctional population and 
are released into the community without any further supervision. Moving prisoners so close to 
release impacts what prison administrators have identified as key pathways to reducing 
reoffending such as the organization of housing, employment and the maintenance of 
community and family ties.  
The instrumental and de-subjectifying effect of overcrowding transfers is evident from 
the next example. Over the course of four months in 2009, HMP Hewell (a “training” prison in 
the Midlands) received 237 prisoners from London and 59 from the South West on 
overcrowding drafts (HMIP 2009g: 18-19). Many of these prisoners were within five weeks of 
release and would require transportation South again soon, but instead they were transferred 
North to HMP Altcourse to free up space at Hewell (HMIP 2010a:17). In contrast, Hollesly Bay, 
an open prison that prepares prisoners for re-entry into the community struggled to provide 
services and interventions for an increasingly transient population: 1 in 4 prisoners released 
from there had been at the institution less than one week (HMIP 2009i: 53).  Thus for prisoners 
subject to overcrowding drafts transfers can occur with astounding rapidity and strain the 
capacity of local prisons to bureaucratically manage this throughput efficiently. At the same 
time, because “training” prisons place caps on the number of prisoners in certain security and 
sentence categories they are willing to accept, local prisons often become “holding” sites for 
prisoners awaiting progressive moves.  For example, at the time of its inspection, HMP 





transfer. Over half of this population spent most of their day locked in their cells; most were 
unable to achieve any sentence objectives at Belmarsh or to transfer out to more suitable 
institutions because of overcrowding (HMIP 2009b: 5, 14).   
Although the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act of 2012 abolished 
Indeterminate Sentences for Public Protection, there were 5,335 IPPs in the penal estate as of 
December 31st 2013. Sixty-seven per cent of these were well beyond their minimum term 
(approximately half have been in prison since before 2008) and only 60 percent had completed 
at least one offending behavior program (Hansard’s Lords Debate, 5.6.2014, C399W). As one 
MP recently noted, “at the current rate of release…it could take nine years to clear the backlog” 
(Hansard’s Lords Debate 3.27.2014, C685). The scarcity of intervention programs continues to 
be problematic, as does overcrowding throughout the penal system, in part because (as we will 
see in a moment) the government’s focus has shifted from managing progressive circulation in 
the penal estate to extending these circulation structures into the community.   
 
Extending the Carceral Chain 
 
Prison systems form part of larger carceral assemblages or networks: island-chains of 
steering institutions, social control mechanisms and surveillance regimes that work to regulate, 
reify and redraw the boundaries of conduct, belonging and eligibility (Peck 2003; Peck and 
Theodore 2008; Beckett and Herbert 2009). Though incarceration may very well have a spatio-
temporal terminus, release from custody is by no means the end of the story. To cite just 2 





the mid-1980s and mid-2000s (Peck and Theodore 2008:252-253; Gilmore 2007:7). Demand 
continues to rapidly outpace supply. In Britain, the government built 9 new prisons between 
1995 and 2007 and spent significant resources expanding capacity on existing sites.  As of 
November 2014, it has approved a new ‘titan’ prison in North East Wales.  Wrexham prison will 
be massive by UK standards, housing more than 2,000 prisoners and strategically located in a 
region of high circulation: it will serve North Wales, the Midlands and the North West of 
England. Echoing what Gilmore (2007) and others (Che 2005, Bonds 2013) have noted in the US 
context, the promotional material for the new institution located on the site of a former 
Firestone rubber factory, highlights the 1,000 new jobs that will be created and the £ 23 million 
of additional revenue it will bring to the region (Ministry of Justice 2013). 
Clearly the prison has become an increasingly prominent political economic catchall not 
just for intractable problems of social control but also labor market regulation (Wacquant 2010; 
Peck and Theodore 2008) and regional restructuring (Bonds 2009; Gilmore 2007).  Scholars 
have highlighted the entanglements and intimate relationships that have developed between 
hyper-incarceration, rural settings and urban neighborhoods where whole districts have 
become anchor points for the relentless churn of movements in and out of prison (Wacquant 
2001, 2009, Mitchelson 2012). This paper has sought to supplement these analyses by treating 
the penal side of the carceral chain. I have noted that contemporary imprisonment involves a 
spatio-temporal process characterized by the tension and oscillation between periods of 
sustained idleness and enforced mobility (Martin and Mitchelson 2009:463; Moran 2013). I 
have linked this dialectic to countervailing modes of operationalizing “power in motion” arguing 





the maintenance and operation of penal power. I have examined the patterns of mobility, 
corridors of traffic and trajectories of displacement that these regimes of circulation produced 
in the British Penal Estate’s recent history and discussed them in the context of estate-wide 
overcrowding and the restructuring of indeterminacy frameworks.   
In conclusion I would like to briefly note some of the carceral rearrangements that are 
currently bridging and interfacing the transportation frameworks inside with the ‘circuitry of 
security’ (Rose 2000) outside. Recent sentencing changes appear to extend the reach of the 
prison into the community and to externalize some of the mobility problems (and control 
structures) identified in this paper. For example, the new Extended Determinate Sentences that 
have replaced IPPs since 2012 will lengthen the average custodial term and involve ‘extended’, 
more intensive periods of supervision in the community (up to 5 years for violent offenses and 
8 years for sexual offenses). Similarly, the Offender Rehabilitation Act of 2013 will extend new 
supervision, surveillance and behavioral intervention requirements to short-term sentences, 
which up until this point have been released into the community with no supervision or follow-
up whatsoever. Importantly for the two most prevalent short-term sentences (6 months and 10 
months) the custodial portion will be half of the sentence (as has always been the case) but 
now there will be a new license and post-sentence supervision period to be served in 
community.  
The above ‘package’ will expand the surveillance of short-term prisoners released from 
custody to a total of 12 months and represents a dramatic widening, deepening and 
lengthening of the carceral chain. It is also likely that these new supervision arrangements will 





and labor market regulations) since the requirements come bundled with a suite of regulatory 
restrictions that impact relocation, employment and travel considerations.  Finally it should be 
noted that the very structures of supervision, surveillance, and intervention meant to target 
short-term offenders (which account for some 65% of all sentenced admissions and releases 
[NAO 2010: 4]) are themselves being restructured. The 35 Probation Trusts that previously 
managed offenders in the community have now been replaced by a single National Probation 
service (for high-risk offenders) and 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies (for low and 
medium risk offenders).  This new division of labor shifts the bulk of probationer and parolee 
management to the private sector and likely will accelerate the dominance of economic 



















Overcrowded prisons in UK Penal Estate, June 2013  
  Capacity (CNA) Population Percentage 
Overcrowded 
 
Wandsworth 709 1,243 175% 
Swansea 240 402 168% 
Exeter 317 518 163% 
Leicester 210 323 154% 
Cardiff 539 782 145% 
Bristol 427 608 142% 
Thameside 600 836 139% 
 
Source: Ministry of Justice (2013) 
 
Table 2          
Flows through UK Penal 
Estate, 2006-2012 
   2006    2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Prison 
Population  


















90,038 91,736 100,348 94,964 Not available 90,955 86,479 
Discharges 82,400 85,500 94,900 91,200 89,666 85,540 85,525 
 







Number of Adult Escorts in the UK Criminal Justice System by 
Selected Type,  
Nov. 2013-Jan.31 2014 
 
 
















832 74 61 9 976  (1%) 
Total Transfers 
to Courts 
81,313 10,203 8,449 686 100,651 (53%) 
Prisons/YOI to 
Courts 
37,134 4,904 2,839 199 45,076 (24%) 
Total Transfers 
to Prisons/ YOIs 




14,474 1,922 485 24 16,905  (9%) 
Totals  154,822 19,431 13,777 1,039 189,069   
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